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of Chinese; and, had the captured men not been restored on demand, I consider that it would have been an act of disgraceful weakness not to have used force immediately in an attempt to recover them.
7.
I am most strongly of opinion that full discretion as to the use of armed force in dealing with outrages on the frontier of this Colony or by Chinese pirates must be allowed to the Naval Commander-in-Chief (or in his absence the Commodore), the Officer Commanding the Troops and myself. The position would then be that, if and when I considered armed force necessary, I should invite the co-operation of the naval and military forces and if the Naval Commander-in-Chief (or Commodore) and the Officer
Commanding the Troops concurred with me and only to the
extent of such concurrence, these officers would have full
authority to act without further reference to London. In
the present case, had the captives not been released as was happily the case, the only armed force at my disposal was
the Police Force. This force is not available in sufficient-
ly large numbers, and is not trained for military operations
and might, in the circumstances have proved unequal to the
demands put upon it, in which case the result might have
been disastrous.
8.
It must be remembered that the Central
Can Government of China, if such ease be said to exist, cannot control Canton (see Admiral Ch'ên's remarks in enclosure 8), and the Canton Government cannot control the outlying parts
of the Kuangtung Province.. If outrages are to be prevented and the safety of British subjects secured, the local civil, naval and military authorities must have authority to act, and to act immediately as the circumstances of the moment
may require.
9.
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